Thomas Hobbes's a priori notion of contract

Abstract

Thomas Hobbes's theory of social contract has received much attention and commentary from scholars. Less attention has been given to his theory of contract as a theory of private law contracts. But it has not been noted by scholars that underlying Hobbes's treatment of social and private law contracts there is a theory of an a priori notion of contract, that abstracts from any instance of contract, including the social contract, and that therefore claims a universality social and private contracts theories don't do. In this paper we expose Hobbes's theory of an a priori notion of contract that serves to organize sense experience, and we show how Hobbes justifies the tenets of that theory.

Thomas Hobbes's theory of social contract has received much attention and commentary from scholars. Less attention has been given to his theory of contract as a theory of private law contracts. But it has not been noted by scholars that underlying Hobbes's treatment of social and private law contracts there is a theory of an a priori notion of contract, that abstracts from any instance of contract, including the social contract, and that therefore claims a universality social and private contracts theories don't do. In this paper we expose Hobbes's theory of an a priori notion of contract that serves to organize sense experience, and we show how Hobbes justifies the tenets of that theory.