Bidding behavior in the Chilean electricity market
Fecha
2015Resumen
Contracts in power markets are usually obscure. From recently public auctions of long-term supply contracts we can obtain information on how contract prices are determined. To understand generators' bidding behavior, this paper examines the Chilean experience from 2006 to 2011. Using a divisible good auction model we provide a theoretical framework that explains bidding behavior in terms of expected spot prices and contracting positions. Empirical estimations indicate heterogeneity in the cost of over-contracting depending on incumbency, bringing evidence of significant barriers to entry.
URI
https://ac.els-cdn.com/S0140988315002091/1-s2.0-S0140988315002091-main.pdf?_tid=c513fd30-b838-4936-a79d-3da861e19283&acdnat=1536091851_a121f44dd8de18e457b1a8b50f878be4https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2015.07.003
http://repositorio.umayor.cl/xmlui/handle/sibum/2642
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